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1.  Many countries in Africa and elsewhere have established marketir.g boards for the
purchase and disposal of major agricultural crops.  Many employ the boards as a device for
raising public revenue, prices to farmers being set sufficiently  lcw to yield a profit to the board
after all its expenses  (purchase, storage, processing, transport)  have been covered.  Implicit in
the marketing  boards' pricing policy  and the way in which it is implemented  there are prices for
transport services.  The research investigates  the efficiency  and the consequences  of different
systems of these implicit incentives.
2.  Agricultural  production is spread over space. The provision  of transport (infrastructure
and services)  and the pricing of transport to farmers  affect the extensive  margin  of cultivations,
and thus also the total volume of transport and hence the demand for transport investments.
Further, marketing boards typically  buy from farmers at depots distributed over space.  The
location of depots, in combination  with transport pricing to farmers, is capable of affecting the
productivity of the agricultural sector and of transport investments.  Thirdly, the timing of
transport in the process of evacuating  the crop from different  locations,  can affect the aggregate
productivity  of agriculture or, equivalently,  the social cost of raising revenue from agriculture.
It can also affect the resource cost of agricultural  transport.
3.  In all these respects, one may therefore search for optimality rules, for rules of price
policy, location  of depots and the logistic  ordering of crop evacuation,  which  together minimize
the deadweight  loss asso' :ated with the taxation  of agricultural  output, for given levels of state
revenue.  The study therefore states certain optimality  rules.  It proposes diagnostic  tests that
can be app!ied (or diagnostic  questions that should be asked) to arrive at reasonably strong
presumptions about the optimality or  otherwise of existing arrangements in the pricing of
transport, the distribution of depots and the logistics of  crop evacuation, and thus of the
rationality  of arguments  for public expenditures  on transport that arise in given circumstances.
Pricing Policy
4.  The polar extremes of marketing board purchase pricing policies are,  at one end, a
uniform price per unit of output paid at one single point of delivery (say, the port), and, at the
other end, a uniform  price paid per unit of output wherever  in the country it is produced  (more
realistically,  at every marketing  board depot throughout  the country). Under the first system,
the farmer pays the full cost of transport to the port.  Under the other system, transport from
the nearest depot to the port is paid by the marketing  board.  The latter is the widely  practiced
policy of panterritorial pricing and it implies a  (full) subsidy of transport cost.  The study
assesses the effects of panterritorial  pricing empirically, on the data of one country, the Cote
d'Ivoire and one of its chief export  crops, cotton. Only the elasticity  of supply  of cotton  farmers
could not be estimated (panterritorial  pricing itself suppresses  relevant information  since prices
are not allowed to vary over space)  but had to be assumed,  and assumed  constant,  and subjected
to sensitivity  analysis.5.  The assessment  of this and alternative  pricing systems is made relative to the objective
of  minimizing the aggregate deadweight loss -- that is.  maximizing aggregate producers'
surplus -- for a given amount of revenue from taxing  agricultural  output.  Theoretical analysis
then shows (consistent with results in other areas of the ecenomics of taxation) that some
transport price intervention  is optimai if and only it output is taxed.  For the special case of a
constant elasticity  of agricultural  supply, the proportional  rate of the optimal transport subsidy
is equal to the rate of the tax on output (calculated on the export price).  There is then an
optimal  transport  subsidy  (or an optimal  location-specific  price for cotton  at the depot), that rises
in  an absolute amount with distance but is  less than the  100 percent subsidy implicit in
panterritorial  pricing.
6.  Combining  Cote d'Ivoire data (available at the level of 56 zones) with different values
of the elasticity  of supply, it appears that:
a.  First, to raise the same  amount of revenue that the country raises  by panterritorial
pricing of cotton:
*  as a general proposition, the loss to aggregate producers' surplus from
panterritorial rather than optimal pricing increases with the elasticity of
supply.  But in Cote d'lvoire where cotton is grown in a very compact
area, the percentage gain from moving to optimal pricing is small:  say,
up to 3 percent for the higher elasticities  of supply;
*  but as  optimal is  substituted for panterritorial pricing, there results a
marked  redistribution  of producer surplus, from farmers in remote zones
to those near the port;
*  and if the given revenue is raised by a pure export tax, so that farmers
pay the full cost of transport to port, the effect in terms of aggregate
producer surplus is superior to that under panterritorial pricing (though
inferior to optimal pricing), while the redistribution  of producer surplus
from remote to near zones is greater than results from a move to optimal
pricing.  The movement from panterritorial to optimal pricing reduces
producer surplus for the remotest zone by about one-quarter, while a
move to full-cost pricing of transport lowers it bv one-third: and
*  lastly, transport investments that reduce the cost per ton-km yield the
largest return (in terms of producer surplus) under panterritorial  pricing,
lower under  optimal pricing, lowest  under a pure export tax which leaves
farmers with the full cost of transport.  The differences  according to the
pricing system (in the Cote d'Ivoire) are again not very large but rise with
the elasticity of supply, and would be larger if cultivation were more
dispersed over space than in  this country.  But note that the pricing
systems that produce the highest  and the lowest rate of return to transportiii
investment are each sub-optimal;  optimality requires some subsidy to
transport.
b.  Second,  if the objective  were to raise more revenue for the marketing  board, say,
to maximize what can be raised with panterritorial  pricing of cotton:
•  the advantages  of optimal over panterritorial  pricing, reckoned in terms
of aggregate  producer surplus, grow as more revenue is raised.  Even in
Cote  d'Ivoire, optimal  pricing (the smaller transport  subsidy)  yields  7 - 10
percent more  aggregate producers'  surplus (for  the  maximum state
revenue attainable with panterritorial pricing) than can  panterritorial
pricing.  The more revenue is to be raised by  marketing boards, the
greater is the social cost of panterritorial  pricing; and
*  as  more revenue is raised, the difference in  the returns  to  transport
investment  (that lowers transport  cost) under  optimal  against  panterritorial
pricing grows also.  Experimenting  with Cote d'Ivoire numbers, under
panterritorial pricing, investment  that halves transport cost per km may
vield a gain, in aggregate  producer surplus, some 10 percent greater than
would appear under optimal  pricing.
Detouring and the Location of Depots
7.  The  practical  implementation of  transport  subsidies,  whether  under  optimal or
panterritorial  pricing, requires the operation  of depots  distributed  over the zones of cultivation.
The price paid  to  farmers at  the  depot will then include the  transport subsidy.  Under
panterritorial  pricing, the farmer  only bears the cost of transporting  his crop from farm to depot;
under optimal pricing, he will, in addition, bear some  part of the cost of transport from depot
to port.  When depots are very densely spaced, as in Cote d'Ivoire, there will not be much
derouting or "backhauling"  which occurs when the farmer has the incentive to carry his cotton
to a depot that is nearer to him but further away from the port than the next-nearest  depot, i.e.
when he carries cotton  away from the port rather than toward  it.  Less dense spacing  gives scope
for such "backhauling"  which  the study  shows  to be potentially  very costly in transport resources
and, hence, in producer surplus and state revenue from agricultural taxation.  Under optimal
pricing, a farmer may "backhaul" when the cost of his own transport exceeds the difference
between the (lower) price paid at the nearest depot and the (higher)  price obtainable  at a depot
closer to the port.  Under panterritorial  pricing, his only objective is to save his own transport
cost and he will carry to the nearest depot.  The location  and density of depots is therefore a
problem for transport policy.  But since depots cost something to build, the optimal pricing
solution is constrained  by the cost of implementation.iv
Timeliness  of Transport
8.  Cultivation  takes place over space and the optimal rule for evacuating the crop, other
things being equal, is to collect first from the nearest location and last from the furthest.  This
minimizes the  cost, whether that is  reckoned in  interest or  in  crop losses:  the optimal
procedures minimize (other things being equal) the aggregate waste through deterioration. In
the Cote d'Ivoire, however, the delay in collecting  the ready crop is negatively  correlated with
the distance  of zones from the port.  Failing other good reasons, the cause may be institutional
inefficiency and distorted incentives for the transport operators.  If good reasons (such as
differential timing  of  rains) do  not  exist,  the  procedure is  irrational.  It  may  induce
"backhauling": the nearer farms carrying their crop further  inland to depots served earlier than
those closer to port.  It may  also induce over-investment  in transport equipment, by the nearer
farms, which may thus minimize  their loss from being left until last in the timing  of evacuation;
total  transport cost  is  then raised,  through under-utilization  of  the  stock of  vehicles or
inappropriate  sizes, and aggregate  producer surplus is encroached  on.  Such investments  would,
of course, mitigate  the loss through  irrational evacuation  procedures.
Operational Implications
9.  For operational  purposes,  the significance  of the study is to clarify the relation  that exists
between  different  marketing  board  pricing systems  and the method  of implementing  the schemes
on the one hand, and, on the other, the implicit incentives  for transport use, producer surplus
and returns to transport investments. These relations, illustrated  numerically  from Cote d'Ivoire
data, dictate questions tiat ought to be asked in evaluating  agricultural transport projects and,
equally, in reviews of agricultural  pricing or agricultural  tax schemes. Specifically,  a pure tax
on agricultural  output and thus also full-cost  pricing of agricultural  transport are suboptimal;  so
is panterritorial pricing and the implied 100 percent subsidy on transport of crops.  Further,
demand estimates for  purposes of  transport investment appraisals should  not  be  made
independently  of an investigation  of the agricultural  pricing system,  particularly  when the system
is itself in process of change.  Lastiy, the location  ot marketing  board depots and the logistics
of  crop evacuation also contain incentives for different ways of  using transport and may
therefore generate a substantial  waste of transport resources.I.  INTRODUCTION
1  Governments influence the price and quality of transport services both through their
ix'vestments  in transport infrastructure  and through  a range of regulations. In rural areas, these
decisions  affect  the spatial  pattern of agricultural  production  with consequences  for the efficiency
of agriculture, the well-being  of agricultufalists  and the revenues obtained from the sector by
the government.
2.  In many African countries, decisions on the pricing of  transport services are made
implicitly  as a consequence  of government  interventions  in the marketing  of agricultural  produce.
Often, these governments establish public or  semi-public  agencies (parastatals) that handle
marketing, and the ways in which they pay farmers at different locations  for their produce are
equivalent to  a  set of  regulations on  the pricing and quality of  transport services.  One
commonly  adopted component  of parastatal  policy is panterritorial  pricing, in which  all farmers
are paid the same price regardless  of where their produtce  is purchased. This is the practice of
the Compa6nie  Ivoirienne pour le Developpement  des Textiles (CIDT), the parastatal that is
involved  with cotton  production  and marketing  in the Cote  d'Ivoire and which provides  the main
example used in this paper to illustrate  and assess some of the policies on rural transport that
have been implemented  in Africa.'
3.  In this paper, I set out some practical diagnostic tests of the efficiency of (implicit)
transport policies emboJied in  state  marketing and  their  implications for  infrastructural
investment, tests that can be calculated  using data that are readily available in many African
countries and for many crops.  The next section presents a conceptual framework for looking
at rural transport and state marketing, 2 and uses it to organize some basic facts about the
operations  of the CIDT.  Section  3 models  the implications  of panterritorial  pricing for transport
policy, and applies the model  to assess  this aspect  of the activities  of the CIDT. Section  4 looks
at the timeliness  of transportation  and presents  evidence  on the performance  of the CIDT in this
dimension. Section 5 gives special attention  to choices about the location  of purchasing  depots
used by parastatals  and the consequences  for the implicit  price of transport. In principle, there
is a wide variety of options here, and the CIDT exemplifies  only one of the choices that I
consider.  A final section makes some concluding  remarks.
' For my  information  on the CIDT,  I rely on Beenhakker  and  Bruzelius  (1985),  DCGT  (1986  and 1988),
and CIDT(various  years).
2 The approach  that I use builC3  on the work  by Walters  (1968)  on the Ellet  model.  Gersovitz  (1989)
applies  this  framework  to some  topics  in optimal  taxation  and  agricultural  marketing.2
11.  SPATIAL  PATTERN  Of  PRODUCTION  AND MARKETING
IN THE  EXPORT  SECTOR
4.  To understand  the demand for rural transport generated by the production of a crop, it
is necessary to  understand where the crop is produced relative to  where it is consumed or
exported.  The essence  of agricultural  production  is, of course, the importance  of land  as an input
and the consequent  spatial dispersion  of production. The volume and location of production  is
determined  both by the  area where the crop is cultivated (the extensive margin of cultivation)
and by the intensity  of production  on land that is used to produce  the crop (the intensive  margin
of cultivation). The boundaries  of the region in which a particular  crop is grown in a particular
country may  be determined  in various ways, by the limits  of the country's borders, by the limits
of the land that is at all physically  suitable  for cultivation  of the crop, or by the limits of the land
on which it is economically  profitable  to grow the crop.  The first two factors  are exogenous  to
the transport policies  of the government,  while the last is highly influenced  by them.
5.  In practice, whether one emphasizes  changes in the intensive or extensive margins of
cultivation  in an analysis of agricultural response to transport policy depends partially on the
degree of aggregation  in the information  that is available. At the level of individual farms, it
may be possiole to see changes in the extensive margin while at a more aggregate level the
boundaries  of the region where production  occurs may not change  at all.  In the case of African
countries, information  with which to study the effect  of transport  policy on agricultural  response
at the farm level is largely unavailable, either because it has not been collected or because
governments  treat it as confidential. For practical  reasons, therefore, the study  of rural transport
is largely restricted  to data reported  at a geographical  level  just below that of the region in which
production occurs (termed zones productrices  in the case of the CIDT) or to special studies of
particular road projects.  It is the purpose of this paper to see what can be learned about rural
transport from the study of zonal data.
6.  The  cotton  sector of  the  Cote  d'Ivoire  occupies about  188,000 km 2,  split into
approximately 56 zones that the CIDT uses for organizational  and reporting purposes. It is
hordered  r.nn  the  easnt  uwest antd north  by  the  internaticnl  bcundcs  of  . country.  To  "'e
south it is limited by the replacement  of the savannah  which is agroclimatically  suited to cotton
by the forest which is not. For these reasons, it does not seem that an important part of the
response of production to decreases in transport costs is to be found in the expansion  of the
borders of the cotton region, as reflected  in an addition  of new zones.  I therefore assume that
the number  of zones is fixed when making  calculations  on the effects of changes  in the (implicit)3
price of transport on production, on the benefits received by agricultural producers, and on
government  revenues. 3
7.  To calculate the effects of transport policy, I need to calculate the benefits received by
agricultural  producers  and the revenues  received  by the government.  The first step is to calculate
the level of production. For the ill zone, production (Q,)  is given by:
(1)  Qi  =  y,  S(pi)/S(Poi)
where S( ) is a function  that depends  positively  on the price (p) received  by farmers in the . .ne
for their production, and p°,  is the initia; (base case) price received by farmers for their output.
When pi = po 1,  Q  y=  so that -y,  is just the production  of the zone at the initial price.
8.  Government  revenues from the production in a particular zone (R.) are therefore:
(2)  R=  [p  -c  -pi  -a  t,  ]  Q,
where p' is the export price of the output, c' are the costs per ton paid by the parastatal  but that
do not vary with the region of production, a  is the cost of transport per ton km paid by the
parastatal, and t, is the average distance from the zone to the port of export.  I measure the
benefits to producers in a zone by the producer surplus (JI) received by these producers:
S (p,  )
(3)  IA  =  piQi  - yi {  S'  (x)  dx  /S(p;)  .
0
The corresponding  total values for the sector as a whole are simply
N





where N is the number of zones, 56 in the case of the CIDT. 
3 It is possible,  however,  that  the region  of production  could  contract  from its current  boundaries,  with
zones  dropping  out of production  entirely,  if the effect  of a change  in policy  on farmers  was sufficiently
adverse.  Note,  however,  that  the constant-elasticity-of-supply  function  that  I use in simulations  implies
that a zone  does not drop out so long as its zonal price is positive. If the number  of zones  were to
change  with  changes  in the parameters  of the model  then  it would  be necessary  to keep  track  of which
zones  are in production  at any given  time, and alter the summation  signs in the following  equations
correspondingly.4
9.  In the case of cotton in the Cote d'lvoire, values for the variatles that vary by zone, their
means, standard deviations,  ininma  and maxima, along with a list of the zones, are given in
Table 1.  I choose to make all calculations  in terms of ginned cotton fiber.  One kg. of seed
cotton is equivalent to approximately  0.419 kg. of ginned cotton fiber. Thus while farmers
harvest  seed cotton and sell it to the CIDT for processing  at the ginneries, I measure their output
in the modeling  exercise as y, =0.419 times their actual output of seed cotton (as given in col.
1 of Table 1).  Similarly, t, is given as follows: (1) divide col.  2 of Table 1 by 0.419; (2)
multiply col. 3 of Table I by 0.26 and divide by 0.067 to account for the differences in costs
per km per ginned  cotton equivalent from the depot to the ginnery and from the ginnery to the
port (see Table 2 on a');  (3) add the outcomes from the preceding two steps to get an adjusted
tj. As for the price variables, the numbers  used in the base case are given in Table 2 and refer
to 1982/83. The value of a'  is then equal to 0.067 CFA franc per km.
10.  One very weak test for efficiency  in the transport policy implicit in these prices is that
p  -c  >a  ti, that it cost no more to move cotton from the zone than the return to sellinlg  the
cotton on the world market (p) net of unavoidable  costs paid by the CIDT other than transport
costs such as ginning (c').  Because  it neglects  the farmers' costs, the criterion could be met  and
production could still be socially  undesirable. As can be seen from the data in Tables 1 and 2,
this condition  is easily met for all zones, with p  -c  = 350 CFA francs and the largest value
of a't 1 being 76.3 CFA francs.  Furthermore, with the government  paying 191 CFA francs
regardless  of the zone, it is still the case that p  -c  -p 1 =  159  CFA francs exce, Js the largest
value of at1 by 82.7 CFA francs, so that the government  gains  revenue from every single zone,
alihough  less per kg. fromn  the more remote zones.5
III.  PAN-TERRITFORIAL  PRICING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
11.  Relatively remote places of production  have relatively higher costs of transport to the
place  of ultimate  consumption  or export, but governments  that buy farm output  at the same  price
everywhere  charge farmers in remote areas nothing  for these higher costs.  They may be said
to subsidiie fully the differential  transport  cost between remote  and near-in  farmers. Production
is more dispersed than is efficient.  Farmers may incur some transport costs in getting their
ouitput  to the place  of purchase, a cost of more or less significanlce  depending  on tlhe  location  of
the government's buyinlg  depots, an issue that is given some more  attention  in Section 5.  In the
Cote d'lvoire, however, the CIDT maintainis  a very dense network  of depots, purchasing  cotton
at every village (DCGT, 1988, p.28). The costs of transport to the farmer are therefore very
small, no more than 5 CFA frawns  per kg. in the mid-1980's  (Beenhakker  and Bruzelius, 1985,
p.21).
12.  What are the implications  of panterritorial  pricing for the well-being  of farmers and for
the rex  iues of governments? To assess the transport  pricing policy embodied  in panterritorial
pricing requires the simulation  of alternative  transport  policies  using eqs. (1)-(5). ',his, in turn,
requires an assumption  about the tunctional form of the zonal supply function, S(p).  There is
no  information available on  the sup,)ly function for cotton in  the  Cote d'Ivoire;  indeed,
panterritorial  pricing means  that there is no regional  price variation  with which  to infer response,
leaving only rather limited time-series information.  I therefore adopt the form
(G)  s(p)  =  pa
which has a constant price elasticity  of supply  of ca,  and I present sensitivity  analysis  for various
values of (x. Using this supply function,  I compare  the CIDT's implementation  of panterritorial
pricing (pi  a constant as given :n Table 2) to the most desirable  pricing scheme (set of pj's), one
that maximizes  the well-being  of farmers (II) subject to the constraint of raising arn  amount of
revenue (R 0) for the government  equal to that raised under panterritorial  pricing.  I refer to the
solution to the latter transport pricing problem as the optimal policy.
13.  For any S function, the optimal policy is found by substituting  from eqs. (1) -(5) into
(t)  =  II +  p(R -R°)
where ,u  is a Lagrange multiplier  and then setting the derivatives  of Y with respect to the p, to
zero.  The derivative of Y  is simply:
d2  yiS(pP)  7dS(pi)  y;
(8)  - =  +  p  S(p,)  +[p-  -c'  -pi  -a't,  I  = 
dp;  S(p 01  dp;  I  s(po  )
14.  Equation (8) holds for each of the N zones so that there are N equations.  and along with
the revenue constraint that R =R°, these equations  determine the spatial pattern of zonal prices6
and the shadow  cost of raising  revenue, A. Note that ,  is the only variable that is not specific
to a particular zone in the equation for that zone.
15.  In the special case of a constant elasticity of supply, the spatial pattei  n of prices takes
a very simple form, and has an intuitive interpretation  in terms of an (implicit)  optimal  subsidy
to transport.  As eq. (8) shows in the case when the supply function has a constant elasticity,
i.e. if eq. (6) h AIds,  the optimal  policy is a pair of constants,  p, and ax, such that:
(9a)  =  =(p  -cs ),
(9b)  a,  =  Aa,
(9c)  pi  =  px  -a,ti,
and
(9d)  R  =  R°.
Note that Px  and ax differ from p' -c  and a  by the same proportion, X, and it is easy to show
that the raising of a positive amount of revenue, R° >  0, implies that p,, < p' -c', i.e. X < 1.
Thus 1-X  is both the tax rate on the export of the product and the subsidy rate on transport
relative to a situation in whic', farmers receive the full export price but pay the full cost of
transport, i.e., in which pi =p  -c  -a't 1.
16.  Once the government  is raising some revenue, therefore, it is no longer optimal  to pass
the full cost of transport, a',  on to the farmer.  This result is illustrated in Figure 1 for the
special case of a  =1  for two farms. The first is located right at the point of export (so that
t, =0) and the other is located at t2 =t  kms from the point of export.  If the government  only
uses an export tax, at rate r,  then the loss in producers' surplus (the deadweight  loss) is equal
for each farm, area D. The revenue raised from the more remote farm is lower, however, and
so the ratio of deadweight  loss to revenue is disproportionately  high for the remote farm.  The
government  therefore has the opportunity  to lower total deadweight  loss while keeping its total
revenues constant by increasing  the tax on the near-in farm (which operates on a large base)
while decreasing  it on the remote one.  As it does so, the deadweight  loss rises and the revenue
falls for the near-in  farm while the opposite  occurs for the remote one, until there is no net gain
to continuing. The outcome  is equivalent to a transport subsidy, and the geometry of Figure 1
can be used to prove the result of eqs. (9a-d):  transport should  be subsidized  to the same degree
that the export is taxed if the elasticity  of supply  is constant. In the particular case of a supply
function  with a constant  elasticity, the optimal  solution  has all farmers  paying the same tax, l-\,
as a proportion of their pre-tax farmgate price, and thereby reducing their production and
producers' surplus by the same proportion. Therefore, the cost of transport must be subsidized
so that the percentage  tax on the farmgate  price is constant regardless of the farmer's location;
the linear eq. (9c) in conjunction  with eqs. (9a) and (9b) does exactly this.
17.  The values of the variables from Tables 1 and 2, eqs. (1)- (5), and various assumptions
about the elasticity  of supply, a in eq. (6), yield values for revenues, R, and producers' surplus,
11, under panterritorial pricing as given in Table 3, col. 1.  In addition, eqs. (9a-d) yield the
value of the tax rate, l-),  that produces the same revenue as that produced under  panterritorial7
pricing,  namely col.  2 of Table  3.4  With such a X, the value of  producers'  surplus can be
calculated under optimal pricing.  For instance, Table 3, cols.  1 and  2 show that the value of
producers'  surplus under optimal pricing is  1.0024 (=12.02921/12.00070)  times the value of
producers'  surplus  under  panterritorial  pricing  when  the  elasticity  of  supply  a =0.67.  For
o  1.33, probably quite a high value, the corresponding ratio is 1.0294. In other words, whether
the CIDT pursues an optimal policy or one of panterritorial pricing seems to make relatively
little difference  to  the  value of  the aggregate  producers'  surplus.  Panterritorial  pricing  is,
however, relatively less desirable the more elastic is supply, i.e., the more producers have scope
for changing  the  volume of  their  output in  response  to  the deviation between  panterritorial
pricing and the optimal spatial pattern of prices.
18.  By contrast to  these results  on overall efficiency,  there  is a  substantial impact on the
distribution  of producers'  surplus  among zones  of switching  from  a  policy of  panterritorial
pricing to an optimal one.  Table  1, col. 5 gives the ratio of producers'  surplus under optimal
pricing to that under panterritorial pricing by zone for a  =0.67.  With optimal pricing, the most
remote  zone, no.  25,  only  receives 0.78  of  the producers'  surplus it did  under panterritorial
pricing,  while the nearest-in  zone,  no. 51,  receives  1. II  times as mulch.  The  coefficient of
variation of the proportional gain is 8.2%.
19.  I do not, however, know how these changes in zonal producers'  surplus would translate
into changes in the distribution of farmers'  incomes, which is the important welfare issue. It all
depends on who owns what land and how much of it.  For  instance, if all farmers owned an
equal share in land everywhere,  a change in the distribution of producers'  surplus among the
zones would not affect  the relative well-being of different farmers.  In Africa,  of course,  the
expectation is that small farmers depend entirely on agricultural  land in one  vicinity,  so that
changes in the distribution of producers'  surplus at the zonal level would affect different farmers
differently. This  conclusion raises  other questions: Do farmers in  more remote  regions  have
more land so that they are at least as well off as fa.rmers nearer in? Do they have other sources
of income that make them at least as well off as farmers nearer in? In the CIDT zones, it would
not be surprising if cotton is important in the incomes of these farmers and if poorer farmers live
in  more remote areas.  If this were  so, the distribution of income could become considerably
more dispersed  by  the adoption  of  an  optimal  pricing  policy  while  the gains  in  aggregate
producers'  surplus would be small, but I do not have the information to tell.  What is clear  is
that if farmers'  incomes are tied to land within zones rather than widely diversified across zones,
considerable redistributions relative to the net gain would have to be engineered among farmers
in different zones, and in a non-distorting way.  Otherwise,  the movement from panterritorial
pricing to X-optimal pricing would not be a (pareto) improvement that makes no farmer worse
off.
4The  value of X  is found by solving numerically  the (non-linear)  equation:
2[y,  (p'  -c'  -a't,)-  '-  (1-AX)  x  - Po*  Ro =  0
where for each block  of Tables 3 and 4. RK  is the value of R in col. 1.8
20.  If, by contrast,  the CIDT were raising more revenue, the situation would be somewhat
different  with respect to efficiency.  For instance, the value of p 0 that maximizes the revenue
that can be raised under panterritorial pricing is given by:
(10)  -max  *'ZYi  a(P,-  aito)}  /'i  ri 
as can be derived by setting the derivative of aggregate revenues,  eq.  (4), to zero.
21.  Table 4, cols.  1 and 2 give the results when the government  maximizes the amount of
revenue that it can raise under  panterritorial pricing.  For  an elasticity of supply of a=0.67
(Table 4, col.  1), the revenue maximizing value of the panterritorial  price is  127 CFA francs
or only 0.36  times the world price  net of costs that are independent of zonal location (p' -c
=350  CFA francs in Table 2). In this case, an equal amount of revenue can be raised with an
optimal pricing policy which has  X =  0.418  in eqs.  (9a-c) and a level of producers'  surplus
1.065 (=6.49666/6.10097)  times that obtained with panterritorial  pricing,  a  not insignificant
difference.  If a=  1.33, the corresponding ratio is 1.092. For this value of at, the movement to
revenue maximization (Table 4, col.  1) brings a relatively small increase in revenue from the
current  situation (Table  3,  col.  1), but a relatively  large decrease  in producer  surplus and a
relatively large potential gain in producers'  surplus from optimal pricing (Table 4, col. 2).  In
general,  as the government raises  more revenue,  the deadweight loss of panterritorial pricing
rises relative to that occurring under the optimal policy.  Furthermore,  it is simply impossible
to  raise more revenue  than that given in col.  1 of Table 4  if the constraint  of panterritorial
pricing  is maintained,  although  with an optimal policy it would be  possible to  raise more if
desired.
22.  Cotton in  the Cote d'Ivoire  is produced in a  geographically  compact area  with good
transport in comparison ;o many other export hinterlands in Africa, yet the government's  choice
of a  transport/spatial  pricing  policy  can matter.  For  it to  matter significantly,  however,  the
government  must be raising more revenue than seems to have been its practice,  for example,
Table 4, cols.  1 and 2 when ce = 1.33.  By contrast,  if the hinterland were  more dispersed,  or
if transportation per km were more expensive, the costs of panterritorial pricing relative to
optimal  pricing would  be higher. In simulations  corresponding  to those reported in Tables 3 and
4, I doubled a'  to 0.134.  The result corresponding  to Table 4, cols. I and 2 for a  = 1.33 was
a ratio of producers' surpluses  of 1.21 in favor of optimal  pricing as opposed to the factor of
1.092 reported in Table 4.
23.  Tables 3 and 4 provide information  to assess the benefits from investments  in transport
infrastructure  as represented  by a decrease in the cost per ton-mile, a.  In Table 3, cols. 4 and
r%  .nA  in  Tab!ha  A ,-nlc  'A  3nd  A  raise the same  rev.enue a  i  resptive  cols. 1 and 2  using
panterritorial  and optimal pricing respectively,  but transport costs are only half as much as in
cols.  1 and 2.5 In Table 3,  a comparison between the gains in producers' surplus from a
S Col. 4 of Table 3 is derived by finding numerically  the p 1 that solves the (non-linear)  equation:
ECy 1 (p  -c  -a'ti  ) i  pi Q  - £  y;  pi a  ,  - Po  1  Ro  =  O,
where po is the value of p in col. 1.  Col. S is determined  from col. 4 in the same way that col. 2 is
determined  from col. 1, see note 3.  The same procedure  is followed  to compute cols. 3 and 4 of Table
4.9
transport improvement under panterritorial pricing and under optimal pricing shows that the
gains  are  larger  under  panterritorial  pricing  than  under  optimal pi.,'6  Nonetheless,  the
magnitude  of these gains is small relative to the change in producers' surplus from a transport
improvement  under either pricing policy.  For ca= 1.33, the most extreme case in Table 3, the
gain under panterritorial pricing is 1.039 times that under optimal pricing. These results carry
over qualitatively to Table 4,  although raising more revenue does accentuate materially the
difference between the gains under the two pricing rules, as it did in the comparison  between
the two pricing rules at current levels of revenue (col. 1 versus col. 2 in Tables 3 and 4).  For
a=1.33,  the gain from halving transport costs under panterritorial  pricing is 1.108 times that
under optimal pricing.  In this hypothetical  example, whether a change in pricing policy is
adopted may well determine whether  an infrastructural  investment  is justified.
24.  These results on the greater benefits from investment  in transport under panterritorial
pricing reflect the fact that production is  more dispersed than under optimal pricing, and
illustrate  the interdependence  between  decisions  about transport investments  and decisions  about
pricing reform.  Of course, producers' surplus is still highest  under optimal  pricing for a given
level of infrastructure;  one would never want to adopt panterritorial  pricing for the sole purpose
of obtaining  higher gains from transport investments. Rather, the interpretation  is that a move
to optimal  pricing, if feasible,  is an alternative  way to realize some  of the gains from a transport
investment under panterritorial  pricing, without the corresponding  costs, and by so doing one
may obviate the need for investment  in transport.
25.  Note finally, that while  the discussion  has been about  a comparison  between  panterritorial
pricing and optimal pricing, it can be extended  easily to assess any other pricing schemes. For
instance, an export tax (at rate r) with private (full-cost)  transportation  would mean that
( 11)  pi  = (l-,r)  (p'  -C')  -a't,.
Such a scheme has superficial  appeal because it may be thought to embody a user charge for
transport, something !hat is desirable in  many situations. As is clear from eqs. (9a) -(9d),
however, such a schemrre  is sub-optimal  if the government  is raising some  revenue (R >0,  X > 0
and r  < 1), which is O.he  case for cotton in the Cote d'Ivoire.  As noted, the reason is that
charging the full cost of transport means that a tax at the port results in higher percentage
taxation of the farmgate price as distance  rises.
26.  The consequences  of adopting  full-cost pricing of transportation  are illustrated in cols.
3 and 6 of Table 3.7 In terms of producers' surplus, full-cost pricing of transport is better than
panterritorial pricing, generally making up about sixty percent of the gap between optimal
pricing and panterritorial pricing.  The dispersion of 7nnl  orninc  nnti  lncd  c  of  mnvina  frnm
panterritorial  pricing to full-cost pricing is larger than the corresponding  results of moving to
optimal pricing.  For instance, for the example  given in Table 1, col. 5, the summary  statistics
6 That  is, the  difference  in II between  cols. I and  4 is larger  than  the difference  in II between  cols.  2 and
5.
7 The effect  on the  producer  surplus  associated  with a given  government  revenue  can be found  by solving
for the value of r that produces  a revenue  equal  to R°  from eqs. (1), (2) and (4) and then substituting  the
consequent  set of p, into eqs. (3) and (5).10
for the ratio of producers' surplus under full-cost  pricing  to that under panterritorial  pricing  are:
mean, 0.98; standard deviation, 0.12; minimum,  0.64; and maximum, 1.18.  Finally, because
full-cost pricing results in  less dispersed production, it makes investment in  transportation
infrastructure less attractive  than under either of the other alternatives;  compare cols. 1-3 with
cols. 4-6 of Table 3.11
IV.  TIMELINESS  AND QUALITY  OF  TRANSPORT
27.  The prev.ous section has discussed the  transport pricing policy that is  implicit in
panterritorial  pricing, but there are dimensions  of transport services  other than price that are of
concern.  One is the timing of transport relative to the harvest.  If there are delays in the
evacuation  of crops, post-harvest  losses may  increase. In the case of cotton  in the Cote d'Ivoire,
these losses arise from weather damage  primarily as a result of the first rains, from brush fires,
from animal  and insect infestation  or other types of deterioration  (DCGT, 1986, pp. 10 and 15).
Alternatively, if actions are taken to protect the crops while waiting for evacuation, there are
added expenses. Finally, any delay has a cost that depends  on an (implicit  or explicit) interest
rate.
28.  While there are benefits from evacuating  most crops quickly, the very nature of a harvest
period for a  crop  such as  cottoni suggests a  peaking in  the demand for rural  transport.
Furthermore, cotton  in the Cote  d'Ivoire must compete  for trucks with other crops that are ready
to be evacuated at the same time, most especially coffee and cocoa (DCGT, 1986, p.33 and
1988, p.34). It is uneconomic  to maintain  a truck fleet that is large enough to pick up all cotton
as soon as it has been har.ested, and some delays have to be accepted.  The costs of these
delays seem to be borne largely by farmers rather than by the CIDT which only purchases and
takes possession  of the crop at the time of evacuation. To the extent, however, that delays in
evacuation show up as a decrease in the quality of the cotton, the CIDT does bear some of the
cost because the CIDT's price for second quality cotton is apparently too high relative to the
price that it pays for that of first quality.
29.  As a consequence  of the peak load problem, the question  arises as to how to allocate  the
scarce tricks  among competing  demands, and in particular which areas to evacuate first and
which later.  A powerful argument  can be made that the more remote areas should be serviced
later, and therefore should be left to experience higher post-harvest  losses.
30.  This point can be made with a simple example.  Assume that there are two zones, a
remote one (two days' drive from the port) and a nearby one (one day's drive from the port).
Each zone produces one truck load of the crop, all of which is harvested  at a single moment.
There is one truck available to remove the crop.  Obviously,  it spends six days on the road,
making two round trips.  Which zone should be evacuated first to minimize total post-harvest
1A%cec  if the harvest  deteriorates  until it is put on the truck by j3  percent for each day so that the
crop fetches  only (1-,B)  of what it would  have the day before?  The calculations  are made in Table
6, and the answer is to remove the harvest from the nearby zone first because evacuating the
nearby zone keeps the remote zone waiting less than the remote zone would keep the nearby
zone waiting if it were evacuated first.  I believe this result can be generalized easily to many
zones at different distances with arbitrary harvest sizes and different  truck availabilities.
31.  While I therefore believe this result on the sequencing  of harvest evacuation is very
robust, there may be considerations  that suggest alternative strategies.  For instance, if rains
come earlier in remote areas, or if they would make remote areas inaccessible  while nearby
areas could still be reached, then it might be economically  desirable to evacuate remote areas12
first.  In the Cote d'lvoire  some cotton-producing villages are unreachable in the rainy season
(DCGT,  1986, p.32).  Or, if storage at the ginnery is more expensive than in the field, it might
be desirable  to match  the flow of  raw  material  to the ginnery  to its  processing  capacity,  by
sending  some trucks  to nearby  zones and others  to  remote zones.  In  the Cote d'lvoire,  the
ginneries  are not cqu!pnrd  iv!th6  Stnr!ir2;f  0t01ns  ?lt'rg,b  T ti",  nr5
t cm-1  Ht1  tn  ltlbli'h  thit
this situation is optimal.
32.  When the crop must first undergo transformation at dispersed processing centers, another
question arises: Should delay in evacuation be positively related to: (1) distance to the ginnery;
(2) distance from the ginnery to the port; or (3) total distance. The example of Table 6 neglects
this distinction because there is no processing.
33.  The answer should be distance to the ginnery if either of the following conditions holds:
(1) the costs to be avoided cease after  the crop is picked up from the farm and the farmer is
paid. This may account for the bulk of the losses, or it may not.  Presumably, the crop is most
vulnerable to physical deterioration before it is processed, some crops more than others.  In the
case of cotton, important sources of postharvest loss, specifically rains and fires, cease after the
crop leaves the farm.  Furthermore,  because farmers provide the storage facilities, the cost of
preventing post-harvest losses occurs at the farm level.  Also, interest rates that farmers face are
presumably higher than those faced by the government, but, just as clearly the government does
not face a zere  rate of interest,  and,  so other tlhings equal, it benefits from a rapid movement
of the cotton from the ginneries to the ports.  (2) If it is optimal to operate all ginneries at full
capacity as soon as it is possible, then enough transport must be allocated to supply all ginneries.
The question  is then not  which  ginneries  should receive  cotton  first  (a  distance to  the port
question) but which zones should be first to provide cotton to the ginneries.  Certainly,  in the
Cote d'Ivoire,  there is no hint that ginneries are being idled for lack of transport.  For these
reasons, it seems correct io concentrate on the relationship between the timing of evacuation and
the distance to the ginnery.
34.  Otherwise the analysis would proceed in a two-tier fashion - first supply the nearest-in
ginneries  to speed evacuation from ginneries to the port,  and then choose the zones nearest to
these (near-in) ginneries to supply them first.  Afterwards, there would be a decision that could
go either way to supply the port from the near-in zones of the further-out ginneries or from the
further-out  zones  of  the  near-in  ginneries,  and  total  transport  time  would  be  the  operative
criterion.
35.  What is the pattern of harvest evacuation by the CIDT?  The CIDT provides information
on the pattern  over  time of  the planting  of cotton and  its evacuation after harvest,  by zone.
Ts,hlp S  r-cc  Inrtvicle-  the mean  niimher of mnonthc  after May  '1  ,until th.e cottAn  jc n1nnted,
by  zone,  as well as  the  mean,  standard deviation,  minimum and  maximum of the variable.
Table  5,  col.  2  provides  the  mean  number  of  months  after  October  1  until  the  cotton  is
purchased  by  the CIDT,  by zone,  as  well as statistics  on this  variable.  If the cotton  takes
approximately  the same amount of  time to  mature in each zone,  then the difference  between
these  two  variables  is a  measure of  the delay  in evacuation.  The correlation  between  this
measure of delay and the distance of the zone from the ginnery is -0.50 with an extremely high
statistical  significance of 0.0001.  An alternative  measure of possible post-harvest  loss from
delayed  evacuation is the mean number of  months after  April  1 until the crop  is evacuated.
Apparently,  late  March  to  mid-April  initiates  a  period  of  heightened  vulnerability  to  loss
(DCGT,  1986, p. 10). Again, the correlation between this measure of delay and distance from13
the ginnery is negative, -0.26,  although with a reduced significance level of 0.06.  Thus these
two measures of the delay in harvest evacuation actually engendered by the CIDT are negatively
related to distance while the considerations stressed in Table 6 and the accompanying discussion
suggest that it is optimal that these correlations be positive.  Why the CIDT decides to provide
this spatial pattern of transport services, and whether it is indeed sub-optimal is something I have
not been able to establish.  The rates that the CIDT pays to private truckers provide incentives
for the truckers to concentrate on long hlauls,  leavinig  the short hauls to the CIDT (DCGT,  1988,
p.29).  It may be that the CIDT is not very efficient at this activity.  On the other hand, there
may be good reasons of the type mentioned for a fear of disproportionate losses from delays in
evacuating relatively  remote areas.
36.  While it is very difficuilt to measure all the costs and benefits of  the CIDT's  policy on
sequencing,  the CIDT does publish the proportion of cotton of first quality by zone (Table 5,
col. 3).  The quality of cotton may be affected by a delay in evacuation.  A correlation of this
variable  with  the  distance  from  the  ginnery  or  either  of  the  delay-in-evacuation  variables
produced entirely  statistically insignificant results  (0.55,  0.34 and 0.45  levels of significance,
respectively),  indicating no relationship between these variables.  Of course,  this finding does
not mean that there are no costs from delayed evacuation.  Quite to the contrary,  the quality of
the cotton is only one possible measure of losses from delayed evacuation and certainly reflects
neither loss to fires nor foregone interest income, while quality itself reflects many other factors,
perhaps primarily the care taken in harvesting rather than delay in evacuation.  For instance, the
minimum total lag in evacuationi (col.2 - col.  I of Table 5) is 1.88 months while the maximum
value is 4.55  months.  At a 25 percent annual rate of interest in the traditional lending sector,
the benefit of being evacuated earliest as opposed to latest is 5.6  [=25(4.55  -1.88)/12]  percent
of total revenue.14
V.  THE DENSITY OF DEPOTS  AND BACKHAUI1NG
37.  Farm outputs are often gathered at depots  prior to transport to processing  plants or to the
point of export. The number  and location  of these depots  can have significant  economic  effects.
One important  attribute of a depot system is the extent of backhauling  that it engenders. In this
paper, ! bend the conventional  definition  of backhauling  to mean the movement  by farmers of
their output away from the point of processing, export or  ultimate consumption, and it can
increase the transport costs of the sector unnecessarily.
38.  Not all marketing  systems  engender  backhauling. For instance, if depots exist in every
village and the marketing  authority adopts panterritorial  pricing, then a farmer gets the same
price for his output no matter where he sells it, and so he sells it at the nearest depot which is
very close to where he harvests his crop, and there is (almost) no backhauling. This situation
prevails in the Cote d'lvoire where the CIDT operates one depot in each cotton-growing  village
in the sector.
39.  Another situation in which there need not be an incentive to backhaul occurs if the
marketing  parastatal  equates the price at any depot to the price received  at the final point of sale
less the full cost of transport to that point.  If, in addition, the private sector has the same (or
lower) costs of transport to the depot it never pays to send produce away from the destination
to which the parastatal wants it to go.  The depots nearer the ultimate destination are always
paying a sufficiently  higher price that it pays farmers to send to them even if these depots are
further away.
40.  Section 3, however, established  that full-cost pricing of transport is not optimal if the
government  is raising revenue from the sector.  In particular, when the elasticity of supply is
constant, eqs.  (9a-d) show that the optimal spatial pattern of prices embodies a subsidy to
transport.  In this case, it is as though the private sector has more costly transport than the
parasztal, and it mnay  become  privately profitable  to move output to a depot that is nearer to the
farm but further from the destination to which output is  being moved by  the parastatal.
Backhauling  then occurs. Even though  depots nearer to the parastatal's ultimate  destination  pay
higher prices, they are not sufficiently  higher to guarantee  that it is never profitable  to ship to
de,pots  that are further from the ultimate  destination  but very much  nearer to the farmer. If there
are very many depots, then the amount of backhauling  is unimportant, because the depot that
is further from the ultimate destination  but nearer to the farmer and the depot that is further
from the farmer but nearer to the ultimate  destination  are both absolutely  very near the farmer.
If depots are expensive to establish, however, there will be of necessity  few of them, and then
backhauling  can be a problem, increasing  the deadweight  loss from raising a given amount  of
revenue  and lowering  the maximum  amount  of revenue  that the government  can raise (Gersovitz,
1989).
41.  Pan-territorial  pricing can further  exacerbate  the problem  of backhauling  with few depots
because, by equalizing all depot prices, it gives no incentive  at all fcr farmers to sell to depots
nearer the ultimate destination in preference to the depot that is nearest to the farmer.  How
serious the problem of backhauling  is depends not just on the number of depots but on their15
location, so that little of generality can be said.  Nonetheless, some examples suggest what to
look for and what to expect  from different schemes tllat may be encountered in practice.
42.  If there are few depots all witlh  the same producer price, but these depots are all clustered
sIear tths UitilliLu  dsu:iSa6uull  tiicil  OdCKilaUling  is likely to oe a smaii protlein.  inaeea, consider
a situation in which the government adopts the principle of paying only one price but in practice
only buys output at the ultimate destination.  In other words, the pricing scheme is one of full-
cost pricing  of transport  because even thoughi the parastatal  pays only  one price,  it pays this
price at only this one location.  In this case, a second depot paying the same price as the first
and located (optimally) quite near it can decrease the deadweight loss even though it engenders
some backhauling.  The reason  is that, as noted, full-cost pricing of transport is not optimal.
A second depot near the first and paying the same price mimics the transport subsidy implicit
in eqs. (9a-d) that minimizes deadweight loss, and at the same time engenders little backhauling,
but the net gain from the extra depot is relatively small.'
43.  By contrast,  when the piacinr  of the depots  is constrained  and there  are few of them
relative  to  the  distance  to  the  ultimate  destination,  really  serious  losses  can  occur  from
backhauling.  For instance, if production occurs at the rate of one ton per km. along a road of
length D (as measured from the ultimate destination), then with only one depot at the ultimate
destination  the  total  ton  km.  to  transport  the  whole  crop  to  the  ultimate  destination  is
proportional  to D2/2.  By contrast,  if a second depot paying the same price is located D from
the ultimate destination  (the absolutely  worst place  for it along the road),  then all output of
amount D/2 produced along the road from point D/2 to D is nearest to the second depot, and
is brought  there (D2/8 ton-km in total).9 This output of amount D/2 produced from D/2 to D
then has to be brought back a distance of D to the ultimate destination (D212  ton-km.).  Total
transport  costs  are  proportional  to  3D2/4,  including  the  (D2/8)  ton-kin.  generated  by  the
production between poinit D/2 and the ultimate destination at point 0.  Transport  costs rise by
50 percent in comparison to purchase at only the ultimate destination.  Thus really large excess
transport costs can be engendered by a combination of panterritorial  pricing,  few depots,  and
bad locations.  In general,  if production is uniformly distributed along a  road with many (n)
depots, each collecting output from a radius of r, the amount of backhauling is proportional to
nr 2, providing a rough guide to the extent of backhauling.
8 The model  of eqs. (21) and (22) of sect. VI of Gcrsovitz  (1989)  can be used to prove this statement  by
imposing  the additional  constraint (in the notation of Gersovitz, 1989)  that p 0 =p, and then maximizing
with respect only to XD and the common  value of po and p, .
9 As in note 8, the model  of eqs. (21) and (22) of sect. VI of Gersovitz  (1989) can be used to prove this
statement  by imposing  the additional  constraint  that po =p, and looking  at arbitrary values  of XD and the
common  value of po and p, .16
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Figure  I
The Optimality  of Subsidizing  Transportation
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Table  1
Deliveries  and  Distances at the  Zone Level
Zone  Deliveries KiLometers to:  Pan
No.  Name  (kgs.)  Ginnerv Port  a  t  vs.  I
(1)  (7)  (3)  Z4)  (5)
1  Tingreta  5281864  130  684  38.6  0.96
2  Bolona  5857804  117  684  36.5  0.97
3  Zanguinasso  3929054  85  684  31.4  1.00
4  Sanhala  3747105  99  684  33.6  0.99
5  Gbon  5938109  83  655  30.2  1.01
6  Kassere  6111095  85  669  31.0  1.00
7  Boundiali  6182039  86  586  29.1  1.01
8  Mbingue  13936334  165  530  40.2  0.96
9  Koni  8690719  57  547  23.4  1.04
10  Lataha  7627519  108  555  31.7  '.00
11  Niofouin  7075521  128  568  35.2  0.98
12  Strasso  4532020  71  568  26.1  1.03
13  Dikodougou  6062180  123  542  33.8  0.99
14  Napie  4739669  93  516  28.4  1.02
15  SinematiaLi  3127790  103  507  29.6  1.01
16  Nielle  11360400  71  621  27.5  1.02
17  Diawalla  8099950  57  621  25.3  1.03
18  Oungolo  9070930  55  597  24.2  1.04
19  Ferke  7677236  132  565  35.7  0.98
20  Tehini  619376  280  564  59.4  0.86
21  Bouna  251275  349  564  70.5  0.80
22  Nassian  588744  295  361  56.6  0.87
23  Bondoukou  699275  321  361  60.7  0.85
24  Madinani  2677229  292  504  59.8  0.86
25  Goulia  4565559  385  568  76.3  0.78
26  Tienko  4420004  384  504  74.5  0.79
27  Odienne  2904497  292  504  59.8  0.86
28  Touba  1607985  150  504  37.1  0.97
29  Borotou  1591761  159  504  38.5  0.96
30  Ouaninou  1380240  133  504  34.4  0.99
31  Seguela  3651850  20  504  16.3  1.08
32  Kani  4935878  104  459  28.6  1.02
33  Morondo  5715800  125  489  32.8  0.99
34  Worofla  2377068  46  504  20.5  1.06
35  Dianra  13538640  31  545  19.2  1.07
36  Sarhala  5310990  75  459  23.9  1.04
37  Mankono  6369784  21  459  15.3  1.09
38  Kounahiri  1466950  184  266  36.3  0.98
39  Foutounou  1389927  186  266  36.7  0.97
40  Tienigboue  4887478  61  459  21.7  1.05
41  Marandala  6649932  161  361  35.1  0.98
42  Niakara  4106491  147  361  32.9  0.99
43  Katiola  5770200  74  361  21.2  1.06
44  Dabakala  1910127  131  361  30.3  1.01
46  Beoumi  2579705  114  297  26.0  1.03
47  Bouake  904872  32  361  14.5  1.09
48  M'Bahiakro  1229859  205  266  39.7  0.96
50  Bongouanou  2602899  257  266  48.0  0.92
51  Yamoussokro  Nord  2013622  30  266  11.7  1.11
52  Yamoussokro  Sud  1555122  .
53  Eoudaie  5463219  i25  266  co.i  1.U1
54  Gohitafta  3161624  148  266  30.6  1.01
55  Zuenoula  5634192  134  266  28.3  1.02
56  Vavoua  7899487  129  404  31.2  1.00
Mean  4657019  140  478  34.8  0.98
Std.  Dev.  3100213  93  130  14.8  0.08
Minimum  251275  20  266  11.7  0.78
Maximum  13936334  385  684  76.3  1.1i
Notes:  Col.  1:  Deliveries  are  of  (unginned)  seed  cotton  for  1987/88.  (ClOTc).
Col.  2:  Distance  to  the  ginnery  is  a  weighted  average  of  the  distances  to  each  ginnery  to  which
deliveries  were  made  in  1988  from  a  given  zone  weighted  by  the  fraction  of  total  deliveries
from  the  zone  going  to  that  ginnery.  Unpublished  data  provided  by  the  Caisse  Centrale  in  Abidjan.
Col.  3:  In  a  first  step,  distance  to  the  port  from  a  particuLar  ginnery  is  a  weighted  average  of  the
distances  from  the  ginnery  to  the  ports  of  Abidjan  and  San  Pedro,  weighted  by  the  share  of  each  port
in  the  shipments  of  the  particular  ginnery.  In  the  second  step,  the  distance  of  the  zone  to  the  port
Is  then  the  weighted  average  of  the  distances  from  the  ginneries  to  the  ports  defined  in  step  1  to
which  the  zone  ships,  weighted  as  in  the  calculations  for  Col.  2. The  distances  from  each  ginnery  to
the  ports  of  Abidjan  and  San  Pedro  was  measured  from  Michelin,  Carte  Routi6re  et  Touristique,  C8te
d'lvofre  (Paris:  1989)  and  the  weights  were  given  by  DCGT  (1986,  p.  24). The  ginnery  at  Dianra  was19
assignei  the  same  port  shares  as  the  ginnery  at  Mankono,  and  the  ginnery  at  Seguela  was  assumed  to  ship
all its  cotton  to San  Pedro.
Col.  4: Computation  from  Cols.  2 and  3 as discussed  in  the text.
Cot. for  pan vs. I  gives  the ratio  of producers,  surp(us  from  cotton  undor  I  pricing to that  from









a  (zone to ginnery)  0.067/kg./km.
a'  (ginnery to port)  0.026/kg./km.
SOurce:  Beenhakker  and Bruzelius (1985).
Notes:  p  is the international  price net of all taxes. All variables refer to a kg. of ginned
cotton. p 0, is constant for all zones because the CIDT pursued panterritorial
pricing in 1982/83.21
Table  3
Alternative  Pricing  Policies
a=0.33
a'  =0.067  a  =0.0335
pan  I  T  pan  I
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
R  13.31928  13.31927  13.31927  13.31928  13.31927  13.31928
H  15.00087  15.01116  15.00630  17.13862  17.14105  17.14019
p  191.  210.  223.  211.  221.  227.
a  0  0.040  0.067  0  0.021  0.034
a=0.67
a'=0.067  a =0.0335
pan  A.  pan  I  r
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
R  13.31928  13.31927  13.31927  13.31928  13.31927  13.31928
11  12.00070  12.02921  12.01615  14.89461  14.90100  14.89914
p  191.  210.  223.  217.  228.  233.
a  0  0.040  0.067  0  0.022  0.034
a=1.00
a =0.067  a =0.0335
pan  I.  pan  I  r
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
R  13.31928  13.31928  13.31928  13.31928  13.31928  13.31927
U  10.00058  10.07077  10.03986  14.14348  14.15609  14.15332
p  191.  211.  223.  227.  238.  243.
a  0  0.040  0.067  0  0.023  0.034
a=1.33
a  =0.067  a'  =0.0335
pan  I  r  pan  I  f
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
R  13.31928  13.31928  13.31928  13.31928  13.31927  13.31926
II  8.57193  8.82360  8.72427  14.69112  14.71218  14.70906
p  191.  213.  224.  241.  252.  257.
a  0  0.041  0.067  0  0.024  0.034
Note:  The zonal  prices  are given  by p =P -at,.22
Table 4
Revenue Maximizing Pricing Policies
a=O.  33
a =0.067  a =0.0335
pan  A  pan  A
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
R  18.66253  18.66253  18.66253  18.66252
n  4.66563  4.90670  9.26374  9.26713
p  80.  91.  133.  139.
a  0  0.017  0  0.013
a=0.67
a  =0.067  a  =0.0335
pan  A  pan  A
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
R  15.25243  15.25242  15.25242  15.25241
I  6.10097  6.49666  11.44762  11.45554
p  127.  145.  186.  195.
a  0  0.028  0  0.019
a=1.00
a =0.067  a =0.0335
pan  A  pan  A
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
R  13.87734  13.87734  13.87732  13.87731
a  6.93867  7.48075  13.02481  13.03852
p  159.  182.  218.  228.
a  0  0.035  0  0.022
a=1.33
a*  =0.067  a*  =0-0334
pan  1  pan  A
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
R  13.37285  13.37284  13.37282  13.37281
H  7.64163  8.34101  14.57933  14.60056
p  182.  207.  240.  251.
a  0  0.040  0  0.024
Note: See Table 3.23
Table 5
Planting and Delivery Lags and Quality at the Zone Level
Zone  Lag in  Months:  Qualitv
No.  Name  Planting  Deliverv  % Grade  1
(1)  (2)  (3)
1  TingreLa  0.84  3.80  99.90
2  Bolona  0.84  4.50  99.90
3  Zanguinasso  0.76  4.73  99.60
4  Sanhala  0.77  3.31  iuu.(u
5  Gbon  0.81  5.11  100.00
6  Kassere  0.88  5.42  95.70
7  Boundiali  0.97  5.21  99.90
8  Mbingue  0.96  5.12  S7.60
9  Koni  0.83  4.71  97.60
10  Lataha  0.85  4.51  97.80
11  Niofouin  0.99  4.58  96.20
12  Strasso  0.87  3.82  99.80
13  Dikodougou  1.00  4.73  92.00
14  Napie  0.91  4.76  87.50
15  Sinematiati  0.80  3.76  99.70
16  Nielle  1.13  5.03  99.60
17  DiawaLla  0.86  4.82  99.30
18  Oungcto  0.99  4.80  98.80
19  Ferke  1.11  4.19  99.30
20  Tehini  1.05  4.39  96.70
21  Bouna  1.05  3.16  97.30
22  Nassian  1.41  3.29  99.20
23  Bondoukou  1.21  3.60  99.90
24  Madinani  1.01  3.76  90.70
25  Goulia  0.87  4.05  99.40
26  Tienko  1.13  4.14  93.90
27  Odienne  1.14  4.39  75.40
28  Touba  1.11  4.58  97.10
29  Borotou  1.01  4.73  98.60
30  ouaninou  1.10  4.73  98.80
31  Seguela  1.40  5.35  98.50
32  Kani  1.29  5.34  87.50
33  Morondo  1.36  4.80  88.70
34  Worofla  1.25  4.44  97.10
35  Dianra  1.24  4.72  86.40
36  Sarhata  1.12  4.89  88.40
37  Mankono  1.38  5.16  94.10
38  Kounahiri  1.55  5.07  98.90
40  Tienigboue  1.52  5.05  98.00
41  Marandata  1.42  5.54  99.30
42  Niakara  1.58  5.01  99.40
43  Katiota  1.84  5.48  98.60
44  Dabakata  1.64  4.60  99.90
46  Beoumi  1.62  4.97  95.90
47  Bouake  1.42  4.25  94.70
48  M'Bahiakro  1.48  4.07  99.80
50  Bongouanou  1.43  4.23  98.60
51  Yamoussokro  Nord  1.59  4.57  99.90
52  Yamoussokro  Sud  1.57  4.23  99.10
53  Bouafte  1.40  4.08  97.80
54  Gohitafla  1.27  3.76  99.30
55  Zuenoula  1.33  4.58  99.10
56  Vavoua  1.37  4.31  97.90
Mean  1.18  4.53  96.68
Std.  Dev.  0.28  0.57  4.67
Minimum  0.78  3.17  75.40
Maximum  1.84  5.54  100.00
Notes:  Data are  from  CIDTc  and are for  1987/88. More  discussion  of construction  of the  data is  given  in the
text.24
Table 6
The Spatial Timing of Transportation  and Aggregate Post-Harvest Losses
(A Theoretical Example)
Case  1:  Nearby  Evacuation  First.
At  Zone:  Post  Harvest  Losses  in Day:
1  2  3  4  5
nearby  0  0  0  0
remote  j  0(1-0)  p1_,p)2  (1-p)3  0
Case  2:  Remote  Evacuation  First.
At  Zone:  Post  Harvest  Losses  in Day:
1  2  3  4  5
nearby  3  1(1-0)  p(1-p)2  p(1-p)i3  p(1-p)4
remote  A (1-1)  0  0  0
Excess  Post-Harvest  Loss,  Case  2 over  Case  1 =  1(1-1)  +P(1-0)4PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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